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What is Pro-poor Growth?
Nanak Kakwani and Ernesto M. Pernia
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the concept of pro-poor growth, and argues
that it represents a major departure from the “trickle-down”phenomenon. It proposes
a new indicator—the pro-poor growth index—that measures the degree to which
growth can be considered to be pro-poor. The new indicator is used to analyze the
nature of economic growth in three countries, namely, Lao PDR, Thailand and
Korea.
Introduction
he renewed focus on poverty reduction as the principal goal of develop-
ment has generated keen interest in the concept of “pro-poor growth”.
What it is and how it works have become hotly debated issues. The
beginnings of this debate may be traced to the 1950s, but the World
Bank’s Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al. 1974) set an important milestone.
Although the phrase pro-poor growth was not commonly used then, the concept
underlay discussions on ways to alleviate poverty in developing countries. Pro-poor
growth was also implicit in “broad-based growth” that pervaded the World Develop-
ment Report 1990 (World Bank 1990). The ADB’s Fighting Poverty in Asia and the
Pacific: The Poverty Reduction Strategy (ADB 1999, 6) indicates that “growth is
pro-poor when it is labor absorbing and accompanied by policies and programs that
mitigate inequalities and facilitate income and employment generation for the poor,
particularly women and other traditionally excluded groups.”
This paper attempts to explain the concept of pro-poor growth. It first reviews
the earlier notion of “trickle-down” development, then argues why pro-poor growth
represents a major departure from that approach. It next discusses the issue of the
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efficiency–equity trade-off, and points out that pro-poor policies and institutions
could actually promote both equity and efficiency. The paper then goes on to develop
an index of pro-poor growth that is applied to the empirical cases of Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea), and Thailand. The
paper concludes with some suggestions to facilitate the use of the proposed index.
Trickle-down Development
Trickle down was the dominant development thinking in the 1950s and 1960s.
It implies a vertical flow from the rich to the poor that happens of its own accord.
The benefits of economic growth go to the rich first, and then in the second round the
poor begin to benefit when the rich start spending their gains. Thus, the poor benefit
from economic growth only indirectly through a vertical flow from the rich. It
implies that the proportional benefits of growth going to the poor will always be less.
The incidence of poverty can diminish with growth even if the poor receive only a
small fraction of total benefits.
However, it is also possible that high economic growth increases poverty. This
can happen when inequality increases so much that the beneficial impact of growth is
more than offset by the adverse impact of rising inequality. Bhagwati (1988) calls
this “immiserizing” growth. He gives a scenario where the more affluent farmers
adopt new seeds and raise grain production that results in lower prices. By contrast,
the marginal farmers, who cannot adopt the new technology, find their stagnant
output yielding even less income. Thus, the green revolution may immiserize the
poor. This situation may be rare, however, because in the long run, the marginal
farmers may also catch up with the new techniques. The more common case is where
the poor farmers also benefit from economic growth but to a much smaller extent
than the better-off ones.
A recent study at the World Bank by Dollar and Kraay (2000) concludes that
the income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall growth. This general relation-
ship between the income of the poor and per capita GDP growth holds in a sample of
80 countries over four decades. An important implication of this research is that
growth is good for the poor irrespective of the nature of growth. Economic growth
over a period of four decades has not changed the relative inequality; the propor-
tional benefits of growth going to the poor are the same as those enjoyed by the
nonpoor.
Dollar and Kraay suggest that governments need not follow pro-poor growth
policies. They should simply maximize economic growth provided they avoid high
inflation and maintain fiscal discipline. Although these findings provide a strong
argument for the theory of trickle-down development, the conclusions are not con-
vincing. Since the concepts and measurements of income, inequality, and poverty are
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not consistent across countries, the results of the analysis do not seem robust. Cross-
country regressions are generally indicative of average trends; individual country
experiences can vary quite significantly.
Poverty Reduction and Pro-Poor Growth
Poverty reduction is about improving human well-being, in particular that of
poor people. Well-being is about the life people live; what they can do or cannot do.
Amartya Sen (1987) articulated the concept of well-being in terms of functionings
and capabilities. Functioning is an achievement whereas capability is the ability to
achieve. Thus, functionings are directly related to what life people actually live,
whereas capabilities are connected with the freedom people have in their choice of
life or functionings. Broadly, pro-poor growth can be defined as one that enables the
poor to actively participate in and significantly benefit from economic activity. It is a
major departure from the trickle-down development concept. It is inclusive economic
growth. Its outcome should be that no person in society is deprived of the minimum
basic capabilities. For instance, everyone should be adequately nourished, no child
should be allowed to die prematurely, and people should be able to enjoy long and
satisfying lives.
The poor have much lower well-being than the nonpoor because they lack the
resources to satisfy the minimum basic necessities of life. The growth process that
results from market forces generally benefits the rich proportionally more than the
poor. This is because the rich have inherent advantages (e.g., human and material
capital) in a market economy. Moreover, in many countries, governments knowingly
or unknowingly adopt policies that are biased in favor of the rich. Consequently, the
gap in well-being between the poor and the rich tends to persist, if not widen, over
time. To foster the overall well-being of society, governments need to pursue policies
that will reduce this gap.
Promoting pro-poor growth requires a strategy that is deliberately biased in fa-
vor of the poor so that the poor benefit proportionally more than the rich.1 Such an
outcome would rapidly reduce the incidence of poverty so that those at the bottom
end of the distribution curve of consumption would have the resources to meet their
minimum basic needs.
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This is implicit in ADB’s Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific (1999), which favors policies and pro-
grams that benefit the poor more than the rich.
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A pro-poor growth strategy entails the removal of institutional and policy-
induced biases against the poor, as well as the adoption of direct pro-poor policies.
For instance, discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, and religion hurts the
poor more than the rich; the same can be said of artificial barriers to entry into certain
trades and professions, or into the formal labor market in general. Macro policies that
tend to constrain pro-poor growth include such policies as overvalued exchange
rates, big city-oriented industrial location policies, and public infrastructure spending
biases toward urban areas and against rural areas. Similarly, there are micro policies
that work against the poor’s welfare. Examples are: monopoly powers enjoyed by
some firms that result in high prices; subsidized public utilities (e.g., low water fees);
state universities (low student fees) that benefit primarily the nonpoor; and housing
policy (rent control) that limits housing supply.
Direct pro-poor policies are also required. These include adequate public
spending for basic education, health and family planning services, improved access
to credit, and the promotion of small and medium enterprises. A well-administered
progressive tax system is also pro-poor. Typically, this means a heavier reliance on
personal income taxation, which is progressive, rather than on indirect taxation,
which is regressive.2 Unfortunately, in many developing countries revenue genera-
tion depends much more on indirect than on direct taxes.
Equity and Efficiency Trade-Off
Critics would argue that a pro-poor growth strategy gives rise to distortions in
the economy, resulting in inefficiencies or loss of growth. Such loss of growth may
be so much that the overall well-being of society falls. This is the old argument of
trade-off between equity and efficiency. Do pro-poor growth policies necessarily
create inefficient outcomes? Probably not. More likely, it depends on specific
policies implemented. If they do, then it may also be argued that pro-rich growth
policies also create as many, if not more, distortions, thereby resulting in lower than
optimum output. The issue of trade-off is closely related to the choice of a social
welfare function. If the concern is more about the well-being of the poor, then greater
weight must be given to those at the bottom of the distribution than those at the top.
In such a situation, the contribution of efficiency to social welfare will be small.
Thus, it may be reasonable to focus more on the equity aspects of pro-poor growth,
though efficiency plays a critical role in poverty reduction policies. Nevertheless, the
magnitude of its impact on social welfare compared with the gains that result from
improved equity needs to be assessed.
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An indirect tax system can be made pro-poor by exempting those items that are consumed proportionally
more by the poor than the rich.
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It should also be pointed out that the removal or correction of the various anti-
poor institutional constraints and policy-induced biases mentioned above may
actually improve market efficiency besides promoting equity (Pernia and Quibria
1999). Likewise, social policy ensuring adequate provision of education and health
services to the poor will improve their productivity and contribution to the economy.
Operationalizing Pro-poor Growth
How can the concept of pro-poor growth be made operational? When can one
say that growth is pro-poor? And if so, to what degree? It would be a futile exercise
to attempt to arrive at a single indicator of pro-poor growth because such growth
relates to changes in people’s well-being, which is multidimensional. Ideally, the
measurement of pro-poor growth should incorporate all the capabilities that enhance
human well-being. But this is hardly feasible. So, one needs to select the most
important capabilities affecting the quality of life, using some value judgment. The
next step is to construct indicators for each of the selected capabilities that describe
different aspects of life. Each of these indicators should be able to reveal the degree
to which economic growth is pro-poor with respect to a particular aspect. For in-
stance, if as a consequence of economic growth, there is a marked improvement in
poor people’s utilization of health services, then such growth may be regarded as
pro-poor. Similarly, if there is a significant reduction in child labor and an improve-
ment in education, then such growth may be considered pro-poor because child labor
is almost entirely concentrated among the poor.
Researchers at the Institute of Development Studies of the University of
Sussex, United Kingdom attempted to arrive at a simple operational definition of pro-
poor growth using a measure called the “poverty bias of growth” (McCulloch and
Baulch 1999). It is “derived by subtracting changes in the poverty headcount3 that
occurred between any two periods under actual circumstances, from the change in
poverty that would have occurred if all had gained equally” (McCulloch and Baulch
1999 as cited in Institute of Development Studies 1999, 3). This measure was applied
to data from two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The results
showed that both states achieved marked reductions in poverty incidence, depth, and
severity between 1973 and 1989. However, the pro-poor distributional shift in
Andhra Pradesh meant a poverty incidence reduction of one percentage point more
than if all had benefited equally; by contrast, a worsening distribution in Uttar
Pradesh reduced benefits to the poor by about 18 percent of the drop in poverty
incidence that would have occurred had growth been evenly spread. This outcome
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The poverty headcount ratio is the proportion of the population with income or consumption expenditure be-
low the poverty threshold. This may be based on either the national poverty line or the dollar-a-day poverty line.
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shows that poverty reduction depends on the rate of economic growth as well as on
changes in income distribution.
To understand, therefore, the impact of economic growth on poverty, one needs
to measure separately the impact on poverty of changes in average income and in its
distribution. In other words, one needs to decompose the total change in poverty into
(i)  the impact of growth when the distribution of income does not change, and
(ii) the effect of income redistribution when total income does not change. The
derivation of this decomposition is presented in the Appendix.
Suppose Ο is the proportional change in poverty when there is a positive
growth rate of 1 percent. This can be decomposed into two compo-
nents, Οg and ΟI such that
Ο = Οg + ΟI
where Οg is the pure growth effect and  ΟI  is the inequality effect. Οg is the percent-
age change in poverty when the distribution of income does not change,
whereas  ΟI is the change in poverty when inequality changes in the absence of
growth.   Οg will always be negative because positive growth always reduces pov-
erty, with distribution remaining constant.  ΟI can be either negative or positive
depending on whether growth is accompanied by improving or worsening inequality.
This suggests that the degree of pro-poor growth can be measured by an index
φ will be greater than 1 when ΟI < 0. Thus, growth will be pro-poor
when φ > 1, meaning that the poor benefit proportionally more than the nonpoor, i.e.,
growth results in a redistribution in favor of the poor. This would be the first-best
outcome. When 0 <  φ  < 1, growth is not strictly pro-poor (i.e., growth results in a
redistribution against the poor) even though it still reduces poverty incidence. This
situation may be generally characterized as trickle-down growth. If φ  < 0, economic
growth actually leads to an increase in poverty.
If  ΟI  is negative, it means that growth has led to a change in the distribution of
income in favor of the poor, thereby reducing poverty. Such a growth may be char-
acterized as pro-poor. If ΟI is positive, the change in income distribution is pro-rich:
the rich benefit proportionally more than the poor.
During a recession, the observed growth rate is negative, resulting in an
increase in the incidence of poverty, which means that Ο is positive and so is Οg. If
there is no income redistribution due to recession, the incidence of poverty would
increase by Οg percent (due to a 1 percent decline in the growth rate), whereas the
actual increase in poverty is Ο  percent. Thus, the recession will be pro-poor if Ο  <
gη
ηφ =
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Οg and pro-rich if Ο  > Οg. In this situation, the pro-poor growth index should be
defined as
implying that the recession will be pro-poor if φ > 1 and pro-rich if  φ < 1.
Empirical Illustrations
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Real GDP per capita in Lao PDR grew at an annual rate of 4.6 percent between
1992-1993 and 1997-1998. This impressive growth was, however, accompanied by a
sharp increase in inequality. The proportion of poor people, as measured by the
headcount ratio, nevertheless declined at an annual rate of 3.1 percent during the
same period, meaning that on average a 1.0 percent growth rate led to a reduction in
poverty incidence (poverty elasticity) of 0.7 percent. This reduction in poverty can be
explained by two factors: (i) a pure growth effect of –3.2 percent, and (ii) a pure
inequality effect of 2.6 percent. This means that if inequality had not increased, each
1.0 percent growth would have reduced poverty by 3.2 percent (Table 1).
Table 1: Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction, Lao PDR
Poverty Incidence
Explained by Pro-poor
1992- 1997- Annual Poverty Growth
Indicators 1993 1998 % Change Elasticitya Growth Inequalityb Indexc
Headcount Ratio 45.0 38.4 -3.1 -0.7 -3.2 2.6 0.21
Poverty Gap Ratio 11.3 10.3 -1.8 -0.4 -4.2 3.8 0.09
Severity of Poverty 4.2 4.0 -0.9 -0.2 -2.9 2.7 0.07
a
Percent change in poverty incidence with respect to percent change in real GDP per capita.
b
As measured by the Lorenz curve.
c
Extent of poverty reduction (poverty elasticity) explained by pure GDP growth effect.
Thus, economic growth in Lao PDR has been slightly pro-poor; increasing ine-
quality has reduced the impact of growth on poverty by 2.6 percent. The index of
pro-poor growth can be derived by dividing the overall effect on poverty of
–0.7 percent by the pure growth effect of –3.2 percent. This gives a value of 0.21 for
η
ηgφ =
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the poverty headcount ratio, implying that growth has only been weakly pro-poor. It
is interesting to note that the value of the index is even smaller for the poverty gap4
(0.09) and severity of poverty5 (0.07), suggesting that the benefits of growth have
been flowing even less to those far below the poverty line.
In Lao PDR, the poor are heavily concentrated in rural areas. It is expected,
therefore, that economic growth in rural areas will be more pro-poor than in urban
areas. This is borne out by the results of analysis given in Table 2. The pro-poor
growth index for the headcount ratio is 0.22 for rural areas, while it is 0.12 for urban
areas. The results for the poverty gap ratio and severity of poverty ratio show that
growth has contributed to an increase in poverty in urban areas. This stresses the
point that growth is not necessarily always good for the poor.
Table 2: Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction
in Urban and Rural Areas, Lao PDR, 1992-1993 to 1997-1998
Explained by
Poverty Pro-poor
Indicators Elasticitya Growth Inequality Growth Index
Headcount Ratio
Urban -0.6 -4.7 4.1 0.12
Rural -0.8 -3.6 2.8 0.22
Total -0.7 -3.2 2.6 0.21
Poverty Gap Ratio
Urban 0.1 -5.8 5.9 -0.01
Rural -0.7 -4.7 4.0 0.14
Total -0.4 -4.2 3.8 0.09
Severity of Poverty
Urban 0.6 -6.2 6.8 -0.10
Rural -0.6 -2.6 2.0 0.22
Total -0.2 -2.9 2.7 0.07
a
Percent change in poverty incidence with respect to percent change in urban and rural incomes per capita.
Thailand
Thailand achieved remarkable economic growth over the two decades prior to
the Asian financial crisis. The consequence was a rapid decline in the incidence of
                                                          
4
The poverty gap ratio is the product of the headcount ratio and the average amount by which the per capita
income or expenditure of the poor falls short of the poverty line expressed as a proportion of the poverty line.
5
The severity of poverty is a measure that gives greater weight to poorer individuals: the poorer the person, the
greater the weight given to his or her income shortfall from the poverty line; thus it takes into account income
distribution among the poor.
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poverty. However, the pace of poverty reduction would have been much faster if
income distribution had improved or at least not worsened (Table 3). For instance,
had inequality stayed constant between 1988 and 1992, a 1 percent growth in the
economy would have reduced the incidence of poverty by 3.25  percent or better, but
the actual reduction in poverty was only around 1 percent. The corresponding value
of the pro-poor growth index was about 0.3. Nevertheless, it is commendable that the
pro-poor growth index increased markedly to 0.64 for the headcount ratio in 1994-
1996, the period before the crisis (Figure 1).
Table 3: Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction, Thailand
Explained by
Poverty Pro-poor
Indicators Elasticity Growth Inequality Growth Index
Headcount Ratio
1988-1990 -0.99 -3.25 2.26 0.31
1990-1992 -1.08 -3.77 2.69 0.29
1992-1994 -2.29 -3.96 1.68 0.58
1994-1996 -3.12 -4.88 1.75 0.64
1996-1998 6.50 4.74 1.76 0.73
Poverty Gap Ratio
1988-1990 -1.46 -4.50 3.04 0.33
1990-1992 -1.10 -4.85 3.75 0.23
1992-1994 -2.97 -5.20 2.23 0.57
1994-1996 -3.61 -5.77 2.16 0.63
1996-1998 7.59 5.96 1.63 0.79
Severity of Poverty
1988-1990 -1.77 -5.27 3.50 0.34
1990-1992 -1.12 -5.56 4.44 0.20
1992-1994 -3.38 -5.87 2.49 0.58
1994-1996 -4.04 -6.42 2.38 0.63
1996-1998 8.38 6.61 1.77 0.79
In the aftermath of the financial crisis that erupted in mid-1997, the high posi-
tive growth rates achieved by the Thai economy prior to 1996 reversed sharply into
negative growth in 1998. Consequently, the monotonic improvement in the poverty
incidence achieved until 1996 halted abruptly, and the number of poor increased
from 11.4 percent of the total population in 1996 to about 13 percent in 1998
(Kakwani 1999). Did the economic crisis hurt the poor more than the nonpoor? The
results in Table 3 show that if the crisis were inequality-neutral, a 1 percent reduction
in per capita income would have increased the percentage of poor by 4.74 percent,
but the actual increase was 6.5 percent, which resulted in a pro-poor growth index of
0.73. Thus, the economic crisis adversely affected the poor proportionally more than
the nonpoor (though the higher value of the index during the crisis implies that the
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relative disadvantage for the poor seems somewhat less than during the preceding
period of high growth). This result casts some doubt on the study by Dollar and
Kraay (2000), which concluded that the incomes of the poor did not fall more than
proportionately during the crisis.
Korea
Korea is frequently cited as a country with rapid economic growth, low ine-
quality, and virtually full employment. Rapid economic growth over a long period
has also contributed to a substantial reduction in the incidence of poverty (Figure  2
and Table 4). The number of poor declined from 39.6 percent in 1990 to 8.6 percent
in 1997. This steep fall suddenly reversed when the economic crisis hit Korea, with
the number of poor jumping to 19 percent in 1998. The impact of the crisis was more
severe in Korea than in Thailand, though Korea is currently recovering faster than










1988-1990 1990-1992 1992-1994 1994-1996 1996-1998
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Figure 1: Pro-poor Growth Index, Thailand
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Table 4: GDP per Capita Growth Rate and Poverty Incidence, Korea
GDP per Capita Poverty Poverty
Year Growth Rate Incidence Gap Severity
1990 — 39.56 9.61 3.37
1991 10.05 31.31 7.08 2.40
1992 4.05 24.46 5.36 1.76
1993 4.95 20.49 4.18 1.32
1994 7.54 16.52 3.24 0.98
1995 8.50 12.65 2.40 0.72
1996 5.98 9.61 1.78 0.53
1997 1.79 8.64 1.59 0.46
1998 -6.87 18.99 4.21 1.46
The results in Table 5 show that economic growth in Korea has generally been
highly pro-poor, as indicated by the pro-poor index with most of the values close to
or greater than 1. It is noteworthy that in 1996-1997 the index shot up to 5.05 for the
headcount ratio (Figure 3). This is the period when economic growth began to slow
sharply but the incidence of poverty continued to fall markedly. This is because the
distribution of consumption became more equal, contributing to a reduction of
4.8 percent in the number of poor. During the crisis in 1997-1998, the pro-poor
growth index for the headcount ratio was 0.84, suggesting that the poor were propor-
tionally more adversely affected than the nonpoor. Moreover, during the same
period, the values of the pro-poor growth index for the poverty gap and severity of
poverty were 0.76 and 0.69, respectively, implying that the ultra poor suffered
proportionally even more.
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Table 5: Growth and Inequality Effects on Poverty Reduction, Korea
Explained by
Poverty Pro-poor
Indicators Elasticity Growth Inequality Growth Index
Headcount Ratio
1990-1991 -2.33 -2.19 -0.14 1.06
1991-1992 -6.10 -6.00 -0.10 1.02
1992-1993 -3.57 -3.05 -0.52 1.17
1993-1994 -2.85 -3.01 0.16 0.95
1994-1995 -3.14 -2.74 -0.40 1.14
1995-1996 -4.60 -5.36 0.76 0.86
1996-1997 -5.97 -1.18 -4.78 5.05
1997-1998 11.48 9.63 1.85 0.84
Poverty Gap Ratio
1990-1991 -3.03 -2.92 -0.12 1.04
1991-1992 -6.89 -7.56 0.67 0.91
1992-1993 -5.04 -3.76 -1.28 1.34
1993-1994 -3.38 -3.52 0.14 0.96
1994-1995 -3.51 -3.15 -0.36 1.11
1995-1996 -5.01 -6.04 1.03 0.83
1996-1997 -6.25 -1.34 -4.90 4.64
1997-1998 14.15 10.73 3.42 0.76
Severity of Poverty
1990-1991 -3.37 -3.38 0.01 1.00
1991-1992 -7.71 -8.60 0.89 0.90
1992-1993 -5.85 -4.23 -1.62 1.38
1993-1994 -3.93 -3.94 0.01 1.00
1994-1995 -3.68 -3.50 -0.18 1.05
1995-1996 -5.02 -6.59 1.57 0.76
1996-1997 -7.90 -1.47 -6.43 5.38
1997-1998 16.80 11.64 5.16 0.69
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Conclusion
This paper has attempted to explain the concept of pro-poor economic growth.
It also proposes a new indicator—the pro-poor growth index—that measures the
degree to which growth can be deemed pro-poor. The data requirements are not too
demanding, so it can easily be applied.
The new indicator has been used to analyze the nature of economic growth in
three countries, namely, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Korea. The results indicate that
growth in Korea has generally been highly pro-poor. By comparison, growth in
Lao PDR and in Thailand has not been strictly pro-poor, although it has resulted in
considerable poverty reduction. The implication is that poverty reduction would have
been even faster if the governments had followed pro-poor policies, or avoided
policies with adverse consequences on income distribution. As expected, growth in
rural areas has been more pro-poor than in urban areas. The paper further finds that
the economic crisis inflicted proportionally more harm on the poor than on the
nonpoor in these three countries.
The pro-poor growth index can be utilized to formulate pro-poor policies at
both the macro and micro levels. The index can be calculated for any sector or region
within a country. It can be used to monitor whether a particular sector or region is
experiencing pro-poor growth. It could also allow one to assess the impact of a
project on pro-poor growth.
However, imposing an index value that is greater than 1 (i.e., strictly pro-poor),
though ideal, may be too stringent. Based on our initial empirical results, we arrive at
the following value judgments regarding the pro-poor growth index (φ). If
φ < 0, growth is antipoor;
0 < φ ≤ 0.33, growth is weakly pro-poor;
0.33 < φ ≤ 0.66, growth is moderately pro-poor;
0.66 < φ < 1.0, growth is pro-poor; and
φ ≥ 1.0, growth is highly pro-poor.
In general, the proposed index measures the degree of “pro-poorness” and
should be used as a tool to maximize the extent of poverty reduction. In the selection
of projects, the objective should be to maximize the pro-poor growth index by
minimizing any adverse distributional effects. For instance, one may consider adopt-
ing an investment project with an economic internal rate of return of less than
12 percent but that results in highly pro-poor growth.
It should be borne in mind that the inequality in distribution can change in mul-
tiple ways depending on how one weighs different individuals in society. In evaluat-
ing whether growth is pro-poor, our focus has been on that part of income
distribution that most affects the poor. The Gini index gives maximum weight to
those individuals who are near the mode of income distribution. Thus, we do not
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regard it to be a good tool to measure the degree of pro-poor growth. The new index
presented here is superior to the Gini index in analyzing the issue of pro-poor
growth.
Appendix
Growth and Inequality Components of Poverty
Suppose θ is a poverty measure that is fully characterized by the poverty line income, the mean
income, and the Lorenz curve (which is a general measure of relative inequality), then
θ = θ (z, µ, L(p))
where z is the poverty line, µ is the mean income of the society, and L(p) the Lorenz function,
which is interpreted as the percentage share of income enjoyed by the bottom p percent of the
population; p varies from 0 to 1.  We try to explain the percentage change in poverty between
period 1 (base year) and period 2 (terminal year) in terms of growth and inequality components. Let
us write the total proportional change in poverty between period 1 and 2 as P12 given by
P12 = Ln [θ (z, µ2 , L2(p))] – Ln[θ (z, µ1 , L1(p))]
where µ1 and µ2  are the mean incomes in years 1 and 2, respectively, and L1(p) and L2(p) are the
Lorenz curves for years 1 and 2, respectively. Note that mean incomes µ1 and µ2 are adjusted for
price changes between the two periods but the poverty line is fixed in each period.
The pure growth effect is defined as the proportional change in poverty when the mean income
changes but the relative income distribution measured by the Lorenz curve remains unchanged.
Similarly, the pure inequality effect is defined as the change in poverty when the Lorenz curve
changes but the mean income at constant prices remains constant.
Let us denote the growth effect by G12 and the inequality effect by I12 between years 1 and 2.
Moreover, we postulate that there must exist a relationship between the proportional change in
poverty, on one hand, and growth and inequality effects on the other. Thus, we have
P12 = f (G12 , I12)
Kakwani (2000) has attempted to determine a similar functional form by proposing a set of
intuitively rational axioms. Using this methodology, we arrive at the following expressions for the
growth and inequality effects:
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G12 = ½ [Ln [θ (z, µ2 , L1(p))] – Ln[θ (z, µ1 , L1(p))+ Ln [θ (z, µ2 , L2(p))] –
Ln[θ (z, µ1 , L2(p))]]
and
I12 = ½ [Ln [θ (z, µ1 , L2(p))] – Ln[θ (z, µ1 , L1(p))]+ Ln [θ (z, µ2 , L2(p))] –
Ln[θ (z, µ2 , L1(p))]]
which immediately give
P12 = G12 + I12




Suppose that there is a positive growth rate of g12 percent between periods 1 and 2, then poverty
elasticity can be defined as
η = P12 / g12
which is the proportional change in total poverty when there is a positive growth rate of 1 percent.
Likewise, we may define
ηg = G12 / g12
ηI = I12 / g12
where ηg is the proportional change in poverty when there is a positive growth rate of 1 percent
provided the relative inequality does not change, and ηI  is the proportional change in poverty when
inequality changes but the real mean income does not change. Having said that, we can write
η = ηg + ηI
which shows that the proportional change in poverty caused by a 1 percent positive growth rate in
the economy is the sum of the two factors: ηg is the income effect of growth on poverty and ηI is
the inequality effect on poverty, which is caused by the change in inequality.
The income effect of growth on poverty, ηg , is always negative, which implies that growth will
always reduce poverty when the relative inequality does not change. The inequality effect, ηI , can
be either negative or positive. If ηI is negative, it means that growth has led to a change in the
distribution of income in favor of the poor, thereby reducing poverty unequivocally. Such a growth
                                                          
6
Datt and Ravallion (1992) proposed a similar decomposition that had an additional residual term. It is not
clear what meaning can be given to the residual term and therefore, one cannot  define a pro-poor index as neatly.
16  Asian Development Review
can be characterized as pro-poor. If ηI is positive, the change in income distribution is pro-rich: the
rich benefit proportionally more than the poor. This suggests that we can have as an index of pro-
poor growth
φ = η / ηg
φ will be greater than 1 if ηI < 0, which means that growth is strictly pro-poor. If 0 < φ < 1, it means
that ηI > 0 but poverty still declines due to growth. This situation may be generally characterized as
trickle-down. If φ < 0, economic growth in fact badly hurts the poor and leads to an increase in
poverty.
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